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Abstract 
One of the most spectacle features anchored in Richard 
Albert’s Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, 
and Changing Constitutions is the theory of constitu-
tional dismemberment. In his masterpiece, Albert pro-
poses constitutional designers who are interested in 
preserving legal continuity to codify procedures for not 
only amendment but also dismemberment, namely, a 
fundamental break with the core commitments or pre-
suppositions of the constitution. This contribution ques-
tions whether the objectivist, third-person perspective 
of constitutional designers can be a vantage viewpoint 
to assesses the socially transformative irruption of con-
stitutional dismemberment. Should the phenomenon of 
constitutional dismemberment be analyzed without the 
relative-subjective perspective of peoples who are apart 
from constitutional designs but actually live under the 
practical interest of daily life? In tackling this question, 
the first section reveals that the objectively observable 
quantum of popular support in terms of the mutuality 
and symmetry between original ratification and con-
stitutional dismemberment does not necessarily corre-
sponds to the phenomenon that is perceived from the 
first-person plural person perspective of population. The 
Resumo
Uma das características mais espetaculares ancoradas 
no livro de Richard Albert (Constitutional Amendments: 
Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions) é a teoria 
do desmembramento constitucional. Em sua obra-prima, 
Albert propõe aos projetistas constitucionais interessados 
em preservar a continuidade jurídica que codifiquem os 
procedimentos não só de emenda, mas também de des-
membramento, ou seja, uma ruptura fundamental com os 
compromissos ou pressupostos fundamentais da constitui-
ção. Esta contribuição questiona se a perspectiva objetivis-
ta dos designers constitucionais pode ser um ponto de vista 
vantajoso para avaliar a irrupção socialmente transforma-
dora do desmembramento constitucional. O fenômeno do 
desmembramento constitucional deve ser analisado sem 
a perspectiva subjetiva-relativa de povos afastados dos 
desígnios constitucionais, mas que vivem sob o interesse 
prático do cotidiano? Ao lidar com esta questão, a primeira 
seção revela que o quantum objetivamente observável de 
apoio popular em termos de mutualidade e simetria entre 
a ratificação original e o desmembramento constitucional 
não corresponde necessariamente ao fenômeno que é per-
cebido da perspectiva da população de primeira pessoa no 
plural. A segunda seção, então, instala o princípio relacional 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Richard Albert’s Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing 
Constitutions beautifully shows us “how amendment works and why it often fails, what 
we can learn from its various designs around the world, and why amendment matters 
in constitutionalism.”1 One of the most spectacle features anchored therein is the the-
ory of constitutional dismemberment. In sketching a blueprint for amendment design, 
Albert emphasizes the foundational distinction between constitutional amendment 
and dismemberment: while the former keeps the constitution coherent with itself, the 
latter marks a fundamental break with the core commitments or presuppositions of 
the constitution.2 In his masterpiece, Albert proposes constitutional designers who are 
interested in preserving legal continuity to codify procedures for not only amendment 
but also dismemberment. The reviewer fully agrees with Albert’s diagnosis: “We cannot 
deny that constitutional dismemberment exists as a phenomenon today: around the 
world, we continue to see efforts to make transformative constitutional changes wi-
thout breaking legal continuity.”3 
However, should the phenomenon of constitutional dismemberment be 
analyzed without the relative-subjective perspective of peoples who are apart from 
constitutional designs but actually live under the practical interest of daily life? While 
1  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2019. p. 2.
2  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2019. p.263.
3  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional amendment and dismemberment. Yale Journal of International Law. 
New Haven, Conn. vol. 43, n. 1, p. 1–84, Feb. 2018, p. 82 [emphasis added].
second section then installs the relational principle of 
intentionality, which is synthesized at the static, genetic 
and generative levels, so that the practice of constitu-
tional dismemberment can be grasped not only from 
the objectively theoretical viewpoint but also from the 
inter-subjective phenomenological perspective.
Keywords: constitutional design; constitutional dis-
memberment; phenomenology; legal intentionality; 
life-world.
da intencionalidade, que é sintetizado nos níveis estático, 
genético e generativo, de modo que a prática do desmem-
bramento constitucional possa ser apreendida não apenas 
do ponto de vista teórico objetivo, mas também da perspec-
tiva fenomenológica intersubjetiva.
Palavras-chave: desenho constitucional; desmembra-
mento constitucional; fenomenologia; intencionalidade 
jurídica; mundo da vida.
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acknowledging that Albert’s design-based theory contributes to balancing constitutio-
nal transformation with legal certainty, the reviewer shares the caveat Tom Ginsburg 
made a caveat that “design implies a technocratic architectural paradigm that does not 
easily fit the messy realities of social institutions, especially not the messy process of 
constitution making.”4 Paul Blokker opines in a similar way: “Constitutions concern then 
not mere legal-technical questions of the limitations of arbitrary power, but equally 
concerns questions of self-identity and democratic self-understanding.”5 These opi-
nions pose a question of whether the objectivist, third-person perspective of consti-
tutional designers can be a vantage viewpoint to assesses the socially transformative 
irruption of constitutional dismemberment. 
To tackle this question, the reviewer borrows ideas from phenomenological phi-
losophy to complement the objectivist theory of constitutional dismemberment with 
the relational concepts of phenomenology. After this introduction, the first section pre-
liminarily reaffirms the central features of the theory of constitutional dismemberment, 
particularly its way of ensuring legality and legitimacy of fundamental constitutional 
change. (2) The second section then tries to bring the relative-subjective phenome-
nological perspective into the objectivist, quantum-based theory of constitutional dis-
memberment. (3)
2. THE THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL DISMEMBERMENT
2.1. The Distinction between Constitutional Amendment and Dis-
memberment
The theory of constitutional dismemberment identifies a phenomenon in which 
the constitution itself might not be replaced in the formal sense but its identity, rights, 
or structure does not escape the change without substantial modification.6 Before ela-
borating this new theory, Albert points out that the conventional theory of constituent 
power is unhelpful for its lack of operational specificity and does not gives us an appli-
cable practice to translate it into action.7 To give observable specificity to the theory 
of constituent power, Albert introduces the rule of mutuality that “a constitution may be 
4  GINSBURG, Tom. Introduction. In: GINSBURG, Tom (Coord.). Comparative Constitutional Design. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. p. 1–14, p. 1.
5  BLOKKER, Paul. The imaginary constitution of constitutions. Social Imaginaries, Bucharest, vol. 3, n. 1, p. 
167-193, Oct. 2017.
6  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2019. p. 84–92.
7  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional amendment and dismemberment. Yale Journal of International Law, 
New Haven, Conn. vol. 43, n. 1, p. 1–84, Feb. 2018, p. 56.
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dismembered using the same procedure that was used to ratify it.”8 One of the essential 
factors of the rule of mutuality is symmetry in that “the original constitutional ratifica-
tion threshold as creating a default ceiling on the threshold required for constitutional 
dismemberment.”9 By focusing on the procedural symmetry that can be objectively 
observable, what matters in the theory is not whether a given major constitutional 
change is consistent with liberal constitutionalism but rather the quantum of popular 
support for the change.10 
The theory of constitutional dismemberment can propose sound answers to 
the contemporary problems surrounding the invisible college of constitutional lawyers. 
The first problem is the so-called liberal democratic degeneration with which the new 
wave of scholarship in constitutional change is concerned principally. According to 
their claim, political actors around the world are increasingly exploiting the mecha-
nisms of constitutional change to undermine the liberal values of constitutionalism, as 
is dramatically illustrated by the populist nationalist movement in Hungary.11 To put a 
brake on such degeneration, the new wave constitutionalists argue, the tasks of cons-
titutional scholars, judges, and designers are, respectively, to develop theories, apply 
doctrines, and engineer constitutions to prevent these attacks on constitutionalism. 
However, given the variety of principles beyond the traditional liberal idea of consti-
tutionalism around the world,12 Albert criticizes such a strict liberal understanding as 
“quite another more serious intrusion into a nation’s sphere of sovereignty and the sel-
f-determination of its peoples to impose on a national constitution a requirement of 
conformity with the values of others.”13 In contrast to the liberalist doctrines, Albert’s 
theory of constitutional dismemberment “offers a way to quantify the democratic ma-
jorities needed to validate a major constitutional change, even where the change runs 
counter to the existing constitutional framework.”14
The second contemporary problem behind the theory of constitutional dismem-
berment is the juristocracy or judicialization of mega-politics. According to the doctrine 
8  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional amendment and dismemberment. Yale Journal of International Law, 
New Haven, Conn. vol. 43, n. 1, p. 1–84, Feb. 2018, p. 57.
9  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional amendment and dismemberment. Yale Journal of International Law, 
New Haven, Conn. vol. 43, n. 1, p. 1–84, Feb. 2018, p. 58.
10  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional amendment and dismemberment. Yale Journal of International Law, 
New Haven, Conn. vol. 43, n. 1, p. 1–84, Feb. 2018, p. 66.
11  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional amendment and dismemberment. Yale Journal of International Law, 
New Haven, Conn. vol. 43, n. 1, p. 1–84, Feb. 2018, p. 60.
12  For traditions other than liberalism, see DOWDLE, Michael W.; WILKINSON, Michael A. (Coord.). Constitu-
tionalism Beyond Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
13  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional amendment and dismemberment. Yale Journal of International Law, 
New Haven, Conn. vol. 43, n. 1, p. 1–84, Feb. 2018, p. 64.
14  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional amendment and dismemberment. Yale Journal of International Law, 
New Haven, Conn. vol. 43, n. 1, p. 1–84, Feb. 2018, p. 65.
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of unconstitutional constitutional amendment, the increasing number of supreme or 
constitutional courts exert their judicial control to procedurally-perfect constitutional 
amendments.15 The more extreme doctrine of unconstitutional constitution was alle-
gedly applied in the Honduran Supreme Court’s judgment in 2015, in which it held an 
unamendable one-term limit on presidential term found in the 1982 constitution to be 
unconstitutional.16 Albert’s theory of constitutional dismemberment is advocated to re-
sist against such minoritarian controls on constitutional change. In the theory of cons-
titutional dismemberment, a court is rather expected to “issue advisory judgments on 
the nature of the transformative change that amending actors are pursuing, and on the 
quantum of agreement that the court believes is necessary to legitimate that change.”17 
The third problem concerns imposed, colonial and resilient constitutions, all of 
which embrace legal discontinuity creating a period of legal vacuity and instability in 
the absence of the rule of law.18 In the history of Japanese constitutionalism, there has 
been a single constitutional dismemberment in the formal sense: the transformation 
after the World War II from the Meiji Constitution to Showa Constitution according the 
rules of constitutional alteration prescribed in Article 73 of the old Constitution. A pro-
minent constitutional scholar Toshiyoshi Miyazawa at the time, facing the end of the 
seemingly ever-lasting Emperor system based on the Devine Revelation, put forward 
the August Revolution theory. According to this theory, the invocation of pourvoir consti-
tuant as the kratos (power) of the demos (people) in terms of popular sovereignty as the 
new Grundnorm (Konpon Tatemae) is justified.19 As demonstrated such a revolutionary 
scene, the theory of constitutional dismemberment recognizes that “a constitution’s 
purpose may change [...] when confronted by a cataclysmic event that cannot help but 
change the constitution itself and the people whose objectives it is intended to serve”.20
15  LANDAU, David E.; DIXON, Rosalind; ROZNAI, Yaniv. From an unconstitutional constitutional Amendment 
to an unconstitutional constitution? Lessons from Honduras. Global Constitutionalism, vol. 8, n. 1, p. 40–70, 
Mar. 2019. 
16  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional amendment and dismemberment. Yale Journal of International Law, 
New Haven, Conn. vol. 43, n. 1, p. 1–84, Feb. 2018, p. 72.
17  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional amendment and dismemberment. Yale Journal of International Law, 
New Haven, Conn. vol. 43, n. 1, p. 1–84, Feb. 2018, p. 72.
18  NEGISHI, Yota. The constituent power of the “imposed” constitution of Japan: an amalgam of internation-
alised revolutionary power and nationalist devolutionary power. In ALBERT, Richard; CONTIADES, Xenophon; 
FOTIADOU, Alkmene (Coord.). The Law and Legitimacy of Imposed Constitutions. London: Routledge, 2018. 
p. 189–207.
19  MIYAZAWA, Toshiyoshi. Hachigatsu Kakumei to Kokumin Shuken Shugi [The August Revolution and the 
Principle of Popular Sovereignty]. Sekai Bunka, vol. 1, n. 4, p. 64–71, May. 1946.
20  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional amendment and dismemberment. Yale Journal of International Law, 
New Haven, Conn. vol. 43, n. 1, p. 1–84, Feb. 2018, p. 81.
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2.2. Legality and Legitimacy of Constitutional Dismemberment
Since the theory of constitutional dismemberment invites political actors and 
the people to take active ownership of their constitution, the post-war Showa Cons-
titution of Japan that has survived for 70 years without any formal changes seems a 
conundrum thereto. Admittedly, the second formal dismemberment in the history of 
Japanese constitutionalism has been sought by Kaiken-ha (pro-revisionist groups) re-
presented by the right-wing, conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Nonetheless, 
such an attempt has been blocked by Goken-ha (anti-revisionist groups) including pro-
gressive parties, many constitutional scholars and lawyers and major media. Goken-ha 
argues that Kaiken-ha’s ambition pursuant to the amendment rule under Article 96 of 
the current Showa Constitution would change one of the constitutional pillars, the pa-
cifist clause of Article 9. 
Despite the fact that a formal dismemberment pursued by Kaiken-ha has not 
been realized yet, the LDP-led Government has ventured two alleged quasi-constitu-
tional dismemberments of the pacifist clause Article 9. First, in parallel to the diplomat-
ic efforts to reengage in the international community under the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty and to establish the defence framework under the Japan-US Security Treaty, the 
Government created the Self-Defence Force (SDF) in 1954 and officially stated that Arti-
cle 9 does not prevent Japan from defending itself.21 Following the Cabinet Legislation 
Bureau (CLB)’s interpretive assistance, the Government also introduced the conditions 
to exercise of the right of individual self-defence under the Constitution in 1972.22 At 
that time, Goken-ha opposed the first quasi-constitutional dismemberment concerning 
the SDF and individual self-defense as a politically-manipulated heterodoxic interpre-
tation of Article 9.23 Second, the Shinzo Abe Cabinet forcefully modified the traditional 
narrow-scope interpretation of self-defence under Article 9 in 2014 in order to incorpo-
rate collective self-defence due to ‘the change of the security environment surrounding 
Japan’ in the 21st century.24 The contemporary Goken-ha against the second quasi-cons-
titutional dismemberment on collective self-defence argues that the Abe Cabinet’s 
drastic departure from the interpretation established by the successive governments 
21  Diet Records, the House of Representatives, 21st Session, the Committee on Budget, 22 December 1954, 
No 2, 1.
22  Document submitted to the Committee on Audit of the House of Councilors on 14 October 1972. See 
Bouei Handbook [Handbook of Defence] (Asagumoshinbunsha, 2012), p. 574.
23  For example, KIYOMIYA, Siro. Kokka Sayo no Ronri [The Logic of State Operation]. Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 
1968. 
24  Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect 
its People July 1, 2014. 
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and the CLB, albeit the their political nature, cannot be permitted without the proce-
dure of constitutional amendment stipulated in Article 96.25
To apply Albert’s theory of constitutional dismemberment that stipulates the 
principle of symmetry and the rule of mutuality to this Japanese constitutional context, 
“it would be sufficient for amending actors to alter Article 9 [of the Showa Constitu-
tion] using the original procedure in Article 73 [of the Meiji Constitution], which calls 
for only two-thirds approval in the national legislature in order to alter the Constitu-
tion.”26 However, Albert does not take such a strictly symmetrical proposition by dis-
tinguishing the issue of legality from that of legitimacy.27 Given the intent of the Showa 
Constitution’s designers to make any future constitutional alteration more difficult than 
the Meiji Constitution had previously been, Albert claims that “in order to meet the test 
of both legality and legitimacy, an effort to alter Article 9 should satisfy the procedure 
in Article 96, which requires the additional hurdle of a national referendum.”28 In other 
words, the alteration of Article 9 would not be legitimized by the default line set by Ar-
ticle 73 of the Meiji Constitution in accordance with the principle of symmetry in favor 
of legal certainty; it would rather asymmetrically gain its legitimacy through the higher 
criterion of a national referendum prescribed in Article 96 of the Showa Constitution. 
If the reviewer’s understanding is correct, this asymmetrical criteria between legality 
and legitimacy corresponds to what Albert would call one of “rare cases [in which] the 
threshold ever [should] rise above the quantum required to ratify the constitution to 
begin with.”29 Such a rare case may arise “where it is clear that the change is supported 
by a substantial democratic majority that reflects the considered judgment of the po-
litical community.”30
The “rare” experience of Japanese constitutionalism tells us a lesson that the ob-
jective quantum of democratic agreement for legitimizing the validity of constitutional 
dismemberment is difficult to be measured by the legality of architectural designs. As 
Jamie Cameron discerns, constitutional legitimacy may be critically diverged from con-
stitutional legality because the former is perceptive in nature and operates at the level 
25  For example, Japan Federation of Bar Associations, 65th General Meeting, Resolution Repeatedly Oppos-
ing the Approval of Exercising the Right to Collective Self-Defense, and Confirming the Meaning of Constitu-
tionalism, Reasons for Suggestion, para. 3.2.
26  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional amendment and dismemberment. Yale Journal of International Law, 
New Haven, Conn. vol. 43, n. 1, p. 1–84, Feb. 2018, p. 76.
27  STERING, Adam N. Implicit limits on amending the Japanese Constitution. Washington International Law 
Journal, vol. 28, n. 1, p. 243–309, Jan. 2019. p. 298, fn 354.
28  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional amendment and dismemberment. Yale Journal of International Law, 
New Haven, Conn. vol. 43, n. 1, p. 1–84, Feb. 2018, p. 76.
29  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional amendment and dismemberment. Yale Journal of International Law, 
New Haven, Conn. vol. 43, n. 1, p. 1–84, Feb. 2018, p. 59.
30  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional amendment and dismemberment. Yale Journal of International Law, 
New Haven, Conn. vol. 43, n. 1, p. 1–84, Feb. 2018, p. 66.
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of belief: legitimacy is an organic part of constitutional culture that is fluid, lacking in 
concreteness and at least difficult, if not impossible, to measure.31 Albert is of course 
conscious of this point that constitutional dismemberment defers to the considered 
judgment of the people and their representatives to trace and retrace their own path 
“as long as it satisfies the twin tests of legality and legitimacy, where legitimacy is a 
sociological measure, not a legal or moral one.”32 This limit is inherent in the theory of 
constitutional dismemberment because its core principle of symmetry itself “is inten-
ded to neutralize claims about the illegitimacy of the change.”33 
3. THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF CONSTITUTIONAL DISMEMBER-
MENT 
3.1. From Static, through Genetic, to Generative Phenomenology
While elaborating from a third-person perspective the institutional design blue-
print for constitutional amendment based on the fundamental distinction with cons-
titutional dismemberment, Albert also apprehends them from the subjective-relative 
perspective: “[c]onstitutionalism [...] is a culturally-specific sociological principle that 
concerns how a constitution is lived, how its rules are practiced, and how the governed 
and the governors perceive themselves in relation to it and each other.”34 Albert’s em-
phasis on the constitutional life that is correlational between the constitution and the 
people’s lives resonates with the phenomenological core concept of intentionality. This 
section amplifies the critical point indicated above in terms of phenomenological phi-
losophy whose emphasis is put on the first-person plural, subjective-relative perspecti-
ve in order to supplement the theory of constitutional dismemberment.
In terms of phenomenology, the universal a priori of correlation is to be ex-
hibited by suspending the judgments (epoché) on the objective validity of truth. In 
his early masterpiece Ideas toward a Pure Phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, the fa-
ther of phenomenology, once adopted the so-called Cartesian way that leads to the 
31  CAMERON, Jamie. Legality, legitimacy and constitutional amendment in Canada. In: ALBERT, Richard; CAM-
ERON, David R. (Coord.). Canada in the World: Comparative Perspectives on the Canadian Constitution. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. p. 98–122, p. 104.
32  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional amendment and dismemberment. Yale Journal of International Law, 
New Haven, Conn. vol. 43, n. 1, p. 1–84, Feb. 2018, p. 81.
33  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional amendment and dismemberment. Yale Journal of International Law, 
New Haven, Conn. vol. 43, n. 1, p. 1–84, Feb. 2018, p. 59.
34  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional amendment and dismemberment. Yale Journal of International Law, 
New Haven, Conn. vol. 43, n. 1, p. 1–84, Feb. 2018, p. 63. (emphasis added).
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“transcendental ego” in one leap, which has been severely criticised as solipsism.35 In 
his last work The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl 
revealed that the gap between the everyday human experience and the world of objec-
tivist science had significantly grown. Against this gap as a backdrop, Husserl attempts 
a withholding of natural, naïve validities already in effect: i.e. “an epoché of all partici-
pation in the cognitions of the objective sciences, and epoché of any critical position-
-taking which is interested in their truth or falsity, even any position on their guiding 
idea of an objective knowledge of the world.”36 
In this context, the purpose of epoché is no longer to directly leap to the tran-
scendental ego (Cartesian way); it rather aims to return from the objective world to the 
so-called “subjective-relative” life-world (Lebenswelt), i.e. the world as the ground where 
we live under the practical interest of daily life.37 Ulrich Claesges sharply discerns the 
ambiguous aspects of life-world: the return to life-world through phenomenological 
reduction contributes to both to diagnosing the dangerous situation of academics and 
to treating therapeutically such an academic crisis. To put it in a different terminology, 
the diagnostic function reveals the ground that objective sciences have sweep in obli-
vion (Boden-Funktion), whereas the therapeutics function remedies the crisis of acade-
mics by giving guidance to transcendental phenomenology (Leitfaden-Funktion).38 
While we are dealing with the multiplicity of manners in the given or situated 
life-world, the subjectivity in question is not that of the isolated subject (Descartes’ ego 
cogito). It is rather, as Husserl explicates, the entire intersubjectivity which is brought to-
gether in the accomplishment. Husserl’s contrast with the Cartesian way is now crystal-
-clear: ‘[a]ll the levels and strata through which the syntheses, intentionally overlapping 
as they are from subject to subject, are interwoven form a universal unity of synthesis; 
through it the objective universe comes to be – the world which is and as it is concretely 
and vividly given (and pregiven for all possible praxis)’.39 
In this regard, Husserl was originally concerned with the level of static pheno-
menology and the most general, a priori background presuppositions of an intentional 
experience: the sense-giving side of intentionality (noesis) animates the sensory com-
ponent of a perception (hyle) as a phenomenon of the objective-sense (noema) relating 
35  HUSSERL, Edmund; WALTER, Biemel. (Coord.). Husserliana VI: Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften 
und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954. p. 156–158.
36  HUSSERL, Edmund; WALTER, Biemel. (Coord.). Husserliana VI: Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften 
und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954. p. 138–140.
37  HUSSERL, Edmund; WALTER, Biemel. (Coord.). Husserliana VI: Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften 
und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954. p. 140–145.
38  CLAESGES, Ulrich. Zweideutigkeiten in Husserls Lebenswelt-Begriff. In: CLAESGES, Ulrich; HELD, Klaus (Co-
ord.). Phaenomenologica Perspektiven transzendental-phänomenologischer Forschung, für Ludwig 
Landgrebe zum 70. Geburtstag von seiner Kölner Schülern. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972. p. 85–101.
39  HUSSERL, Edmund; WALTER, Biemel. (Coord.). Husserliana VI: Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften 
und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954. p. 170–173.
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to an object.40 Without intentionalities, Husserl argues, the objects and the world would 
not be there for us; they rather ‘exist for us only with the meaning and the mode of 
being that they receive in constantly arising or having arisen out of those subjective 
accomplishments’.41 
The second level of intentional synthesis is called genetic in that it uncovers the 
temporal becoming and the temporal relationship of one experience to the next, there-
by revealing a ‘temporal depth’ of any experience, which cannot be achieved through 
static analysis.42 In developing the ontology of life-world in Crisis, Husserl emphasizes 
that every perception has a horizon belonging to its object: “[i]n seeing I always ‘mean’ 
it with all the sides which are in no way given to me, not even in the form of intuitive, 
anticipatory presentifications (Vergegenwärtigung)”: In other words, “a whole horizon of 
nonactive and yet confunctioning manners of appearance and syntheses of validity is 
implied in a particular perception.”43 Although perception is related only to the present, 
this present is always meant as having an endless past behind it (a continuity of reten-
tion), and an open future before it (a continuity of protention).44 
Third, Husserl’s late reflections in Generativität is inherited and sophisticated as 
generative phenomenology by Anthony Steinbock. As is explicated in Steinbock’s Home 
and Beyond, compared to the foregoing static and genetic methods, the generative 
analysis captures the constitutive duet between home-/alien-worlds: the “co-constitu-
tion of the alien through appropriative experience of the home,” on the one hand, and 
the “co-constitution of the home through the transgressive experience of the alien,” on 
the other hand. In characterizing the synergy between home and alien as co-genera-
tive, Steinbock notes that “neither home-world nor alien-world can be regarded as the 
‘original sphere’ since they are in a continual historical becoming as delimited from one 
another.”45 
40  For the concept of intentionality, see MCINTYRE, Ronald; SMITH, David Woodruff. Theory of intentionality. 
In MOHANTY, J. N.; MCKENNA, William R. (Coord.). Husserl’s Phenomenology: A Textbook. Washington, D. C.: 
Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and University Press of America, 1989. p. 147–170.
41  HUSSERL, Edmund; WALTER, Biemel. (Coord.). Husserliana VI: Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften 
und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954. p. 163.
42  DONOHOE, Janet. Husserl on Ethics and Intersubjectivity:  From Static and Genetic Phenomenology. 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016. p. 30–37.
43  USSERL, Edmund; WALTER, Biemel. (Coord.). Husserliana VI: Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften 
und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954. p. 159–163.
44  USSERL, Edmund; WALTER, Biemel. (Coord.). Husserliana VI: Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften 
und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954. p. 159–163.
45  STEINBOCK, Anthony. Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology after Husserl. Evanston, Ill: North-
western University Press Evanston 1995, p. 179 [emphasis in the original text].
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3.2. The Static, Genetic and Generative Intentionality of Constitutio-
nal Dismemberment 
In the field of legal philosophy, Hans Lindahl borrows phenomenological insi-
ghts from Husserl and invents the concept of legal intentionality. In the static sense, this 
correlative notion is invoked to elucidate the (constitutive) legal ordering, rather than 
the (descriptive) legal order, from a first-person plural perspective: to act legally is to 
disclose something as something, and to disclose something as something is to order, 
in terms of the subjective (as someone), material (as somewhat), spatial (as somewhere) 
and temporal (as somewhen) dimensions.46 Lindahl also introduces the genetic concept 
of horizon to legal intentionality whence the members of a legal collective anticipate 
in a general ways who ought to do what, where and when.47 This horizon has the back-
ground of collective action, meaning by such that all collective action is conditioned by 
a variable range of everyday practices, capacities, and assumptions into which its par-
ticipants are socialized, yet which are not themselves thematized in the course of joint 
action.48 For Lindahl the articulation of the background and horizon of collective action 
constructs its Umwelt as the circumambient world, or Lebenswelt in the framework of 
Husserl’s Crisis, in which joint action takes place.49 In the generative analysis, Lindahl 
grasps the momentum of a-legality when the circumambient life-world of collective ac-
tion becomes conspicuous as a familiar home-world (Heimwelt) to its participants in the 
form of strange behaviors and situations that irrupt from the domain of the unordered 
as an alien-world (Fremdwelt) by challenging the boundaries of (il)legality.50
The foregoing phenomenological legal approach is quite useful for reshaping 
the discourses of constitutional law including the theory of constitutional dismem-
berment. According to Kim Lane Scheppele, while the existing literature has taken 
the view of a constitution as a text or as a set of visible and functioning institutions 
from the third-person perspective, the phenomenological approach focuses our atten-
tion on the way that people experience constitutional life from the first-person plural 
46  LINDAHL, Hans. Fault Lines of Globalization: Legal Order and the Politics of A-Legality. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013. p. 125–129.
47  LINDAHL, Hans. Fault Lines of Globalization: Legal Order and the Politics of A-Legality. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013. p. 129–133.
48  LINDAHL, Hans. Intentionality, Representation, Recognition: Phenomenology and the Politics of A-Legality. 
In: BEDORF, Thomas; HERRMANN, Steffen (Coord.). Political Phenomenology: Experience, Ontology, Episte-
me. Abingdon: Routledge, 2019.
49  LINDAHL, Hans. Intentionality, Representation, Recognition: Phenomenology and the Politics of A-Legality. 
In: BEDORF, Thomas; HERRMANN, Steffen (Coord.). Political Phenomenology: Experience, Ontology, Episte-
me. Abingdon: Routledge, 2019.
50  LINDAHL, Hans. Fault Lines of Globalization: Legal Order and the Politics of A-Legality. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013. p. 156–163.
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perspective.51 Put differently, it examines the way that constitutional knowledge comes 
to be developed, shared and passed on as the result of social interaction, through insti-
tutions, across history and as sedimented fact that becomes part of the taken-for-grant-
ed world.52 
Seen from the first-person plural perspective of phenomenology, for example, 
the legitimacy of the 2012 Hungarian Constitution as constitutional dismemberment 
can be narrated in a way of complementing the third-person perspective of Albert’s 
architectural theory.53 After the fall of communism in Hungary, the legal order of liberal 
constitutionalism based on the 1989 Constitution emerged as an elite project by the 
strong resolve across the political spectrum to join the European Union and by the ce-
lebration of human rights. The project was intersubjectively agreed by the masses as 
long as it delivered hope and the promise of prosperity and as long as it was associated 
with the restoration of national sovereignty. Through nearly two decades, the liberal 
constitutional order quickly became a taken-for-granted life-world, or more concretely, 
home-world for them. However, as an unthematized background, the 1989 Constitution 
that was supposed to create democracy, end corruption, bring economic prosperity 
and create better lives had already appeared unable to achieve those goals in the eyes 
of the population. In terms of horizon, as was evinced by social survey reflecting a lived 
experience of getting worse, the evaporation of the support for liberal constitutiona-
lism’s premises had already started for years before the 1989 Constitution itself finally 
failed in 2010, which became affiliated with the rise of counter-constitutional ideas. 
In that situation, counter-constitutionalists interrupted from an another collective of 
alien-world embracing alternative visions of constitutional ordering, grounded in diffe-
rent understandings that reject the liberal constitutional vision already in effect. 
The phenomenological approach also proposes another scenario to narrate 
the ever-unamended post-war Japanese Constitution which Albert’s symmetrical ac-
count categorizes as an asymmetrical, rare exception. As noted above, although Go-
ken-ha once criticized the first quasi-constitutional dismemberment concerning the 
SDF and individual self-defense as a politically-manipulated heterodoxic interpreta-
tion of Article 9, it has come to recognize the orthodoxy of that interpretation estab-
lished by the successive governments and the CLB when opposing against the second 
51  SCHEPPELE, Kim Lane. The Social Lives of Constitutions. In: BLOKKER, Paul; THORNHILL, Chris (Coord.). So-
ciological Constitutionalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. p. 35–63, p. 55
52  SCHEPPELE, Kim Lane. The Social Lives of Constitutions. In: BLOKKER, Paul; THORNHILL, Chris (Coord.). So-
ciological Constitutionalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. p. 35–63, p. 51.
53  For this paragraph, see in general SCHEPPELE, Kim Lane. The Social Lives of Constitutions. In: BLOKKER, 
Paul; THORNHILL, Chris (Coord.). Sociological Constitutionalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2017. p. 35–63, p. 59–63.
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quasi-constitutional dismemberment on collective self-defence.54 In other words, the 
legal intentionality of Article 9 within the familiar constitutional order (Heimwelt) has 
been over generations modified co-generatively through the transgressive irruption 
from the unordered sphere (Fremdwelt) as another way of constitutionalizing pacifism. 
As the unthematized background of such a modification, Satoshi Yokodaido diagnoses 
that a pathological phenomenon flourishes among ordinary people due to the elitist 
controversy between Kaiken-ha and Goken-ha: “the Japanese people have gradually 
lost trust in the normative forces of the Constitution’s text and have regarded it as so 
flexible that it can fit almost any changing environment.”55 This prevailing pathology, 
reasonably inferred from the result of recent opinion polls, indicates that majority of 
ordinary people of respondents think Abe’s attempt to change the interpretation of the 
Constitution is unconstitutional but at the same time do not seem to think the state 
of unconstitutionality should be solved as soon as possible.56 This phenomenological 
focus on the first-person plural perspective of ordinary citizens offers a different rea-
son form the explanations of either the Kaiken-ha or Goken-ha on the stability of the 
Constitution: the former bases its reasoning on the asymmetrical strictness of its cons-
titutional amendment procedure under Article 96, and the latter puts an emphasis on 
the Japanese people’s profound endorsement of the Constitution and its philosophy.57 
The normativity of Article 9 has been gradually dismembered without following pro-
cedural requirements of Article 96 but due to the relational irruption to the people’s 
intentionality.
4. CONCLUSION
The theory of constitutional dismemberment unpacked by Richard Albert in his 
masterpieces has a great potential to redeem the mysterious concept of constituent 
power as a technically controllable notion for contemporary constitutional transforma-
tions. However, its focus on the objectively observable quantum of popular support in 
terms of the mutuality and symmetry between original ratification and constitutional 
dismemberment does not necessarily corresponds to the phenomenon that is percei-
ved from the first-person person plural perspective of population. It should be remin-
ded here that the Husserlian concept of Lebenswelt does not negate the achievements 
54  YAMAMOTO, Hajime; NEGISHI, Yota. Japan. In: PALOMBINO, Fulvio M. (Coord.). Duelling for Supremacy: 
International vs. National Fundamental Principles. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. p. 210–233, 
p. 224–228.
55  YOKODAIDO, Satoshi. Constitutional stability in Japan not due to popular approval. German Law Journal. 
vol. 20, n. 2, p. 263–283, Apr. 2019. p. 282.
56  YOKODAIDO, Satoshi. Constitutional stability in Japan not due to popular approval.  German Law Journal, 
vol. 20, n. 2, p. 263–283, Apr. 2019. p. 273.
57  YOKODAIDO, Satoshi. Constitutional stability in Japan not due to popular approval. German Law Journal. 
vol. 20, n. 2, p. 263–283, Apr. 2019. p. 265–267.
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of objective science but rather purports to restore the practical interest of daily life as 
the essential ground that objective sciences have sweep in oblivion. Inheriting this 
purpose, this contribution installed the relational principle of intentionality, which is 
synthesized at the static, genetic and generative levels, so that the practice of cons-
titutional dismemberment can be grasped not only from the objectively theoretical 
viewpoint but also from the inter-subjective phenomenological perspective. 
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